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This paper focuses on market-making in the higher education sector and particularly on the role of the 
market ordering processes. The entry point to examine relations between market ordering and market-
making is a private company called ICEF GmbH from Germany. ICEF is engaged in selling particular 
kinds of education services, delivered by orchestrating market encounters between education 
institutions and international student recruitment agents. The novelty of ICEF’s approach to making 
markets is that it draws on two existing markets in order to be able to monetise the particular market 
encounters. The first market is the higher education sector as an export industry, which ICEF both 
promotes and also legitimates. The second market concerns international student recruitment agents, 
in which ICEF actively constructs market ordering mechanisms. In doing so, ICEF is expanding their 
own opportunities for making profits at the same time as expanding higher education markets more 
broadly. 
 





There is an increasing number of students who enrol to study at the higher education level outside of 
their home country (Robertson & Komljenovic, 2016; Stein & de Andreotti, 2015), and the latest 
available data show that there are four and a half million such students worldwide (OECD, 2015). 
This growing number is relevant for higher education to be framed as an export industry by a rising 
number of countries. Three such countries are the UK, which estimates that the educational services it 
exports are worth £17.5 billion (HM Government, 2013), the USA, which states that international 
students contribute $24.7 billion to the US economy (Institute of International Education, 2015), and 
Australia that considers education to be its fourth largest export sector (Maslen, 2012) and the largest 
services export (Universities Australia, 2015). The global education industry as a whole is estimated 
to be worth $4.4 trillion (Strauss, 2013) and it therefore seems not surprising that the higher education 
industry has attracted the attention of many different actors ranging from private for-profit to other 
alternative higher education providers, from national governments to international organisations, and 
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escalating number of private firms selling things and services to universities
1
 (Verger, Lubienski, & 
Steiner-Khamsi, 2016). 
 
As universities increasingly compete for international students, they show ever more diverse practices 
of promotion and branding (Cronin, 2016; Drori, Delmestri, & Oberg, 2013), such as direct internet 
marketing, engagement with social media, visiting recruitment fairs, visiting secondary schools, 
incorporating alumni into university promotion, and so on. This has increased opportunity also for the 
international students’ recruitment agents to expand or strengthen their activity in the higher education 
level of education (Robertson & Komljenovic, 2016), which is the focus of this paper.  
 
An international students’ recruitment agent is: “…an individual, company, or organization that 
provides educational advice, support, and placement to students in a local market who are interested 
in studying abroad” (De Luca, 2008, p. 36). Agents are paid in different ways, but normally 
universities pay fees to them that usually range between 10 and 17.5 per cent of first year’s tuition fee 
(ICEF Monitor, 2014). In the UK the average agent fee is £1,767, but this depends on the region, the 
market and the institution, as identified by the Times Higher Education’s investigation of 158 
universities (Havergal 2015).  
 
Agents are an influential factor in students’ decision-making, as well as in universities’ success in 
attracting high numbers of international students (Huang, Raimo, & Humfrey, 2014; Mazzarol & 
Soutar, 2012; O’Connell & Wong, 2014). A 2011 British Council report found that “…48% of 
interviewed East Asian students had contacts with an agent, compared to 41% in Africa, 39% in South 
Asia, 30% in Latin America, and 23% in Europe” (ACA, 2011). Pimpa (2003) reports that recruitment 
agents and peers are the most influential factors for Thai students in Australia, and that agents 
exercise a stronger influence than peers. The Observatory on Borderless Higher Education (2014) 
found that 56 per cent of international students in Malaysia are recruited by agents, 56 per cent of 
international students in Australia, 47 per cent in New Zealand, 41 per cent in Canada, 38 per cent in 
the UK, 20 per cent in the Netherlands, and 11 per cent in the USA (The Observatory on Borderless 
Higher Education, 2014). Agents have thus become increasingly important and powerful players in 
international student mobility flows over time (Thomson, Hulme, Hulme, & Doughty, 2014). 
 
However, universities using recruitment agents is still a rather new and incredibly uneven practice 
among countries as well as among universities. There are numerous debates and doubts about the 
legitimacy and consequences of this service; and only small numbers of countries have started 
building market institutions around recruitment agents (Chopra, 2015; Raimo, 2014).  
 
Albeit international students’ recruitment agents seem to be important actors in the higher education 
industry, the research on them in the context of higher education is surprisingly scarce. The aim of 
this paper is therefore twofold. The first is to bring forward the market ordering and market 
institutional analysis of studying market-making – the theoretical and analytical aspect of the analysis. 
And second is to analyse the outcomes of market-making specifically for the case of the international 
students’ recruitment agents markets and the higher education sector.  
 
                                                 
1
 In this paper I am using the term ‘university’ generically so that it includes all education institutions at the 
higher education level regardless of their form or name. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. After making theoretical and methodological notes I provide a short 
description of the case, ICEF GmbH. I then move to explore ICEF’s position and role in the 
crossroads of the two markets, namely the international students market and recruitment agents 
markets. This is followed by a detailed analysis of market ordering as a device for market-making 
using the case of recruitment agents market. I conclude with a discussion of ICEF’s role in expanding 
higher education markets more broadly. 
 
 
2. Theoretical and methodological notes 
 
Theoretically, this paper works with the sociological approaches to markets, in which markets are 
understood as arenas of social interactions (Aspers, 2011; Beckert, 2009). I follow Callon with 
colleagues (Çalışkan & Callon, 2009, 2010, Callon, 1998a, 1998b, 2007; Callon & Muniesa, 2005; 
Muniesa, Millo, & Callon, 2007a, 2007b), who understand markets as socio-technical agencements. 
Socio-technical refers to a combination of humans, technology, algorithms and other mechanisms; 
whilst agencement refers to this combination collectively having an emergent agency with 
new/specific capabilities including performativity. An example from the world of finance would be 
that of a trader with a computer, who has a rather different kind of agency than a trader without access 
to this technology; and a combination of all traders with all technological tools, algorithms, forms of 
communication and other tools and devices together have emerging agency in that they cause or 
influence particular expectations, behaviour, and practices. Markets therefore have power to set things 
in motion, albeit their structure is relational, and actors constantly re-structure markets.  
 
A particularly lucrative insight from this literature is the role of the non-human. What is non-human is 
very diverse and includes technological developments (computers, telephones, software, internet and 
so on), algorithms, calculation, institutions, prices, rankings, standards, and so on. These are also 
understood as market devices, a notion referring to the “material and discursive assemblages that 
intervene in the construction of markets” (Muniesa et al., 2007b, p.2). This notion is useful because if 
objects are understood as devices they can be brought into sociological analysis. These objects can 
then be considered as having agency since they “articulate actions; they act or they make others act” 
(Muniesa et al., 2007b, p.2). These devices are part of markets/agencements – assemblages that have 
an emergent agentic quality as mentioned before.  
 
For a device to be a market device we should be able to trace its agency in the organization of 
markets. Something is a market device because it reconfigures particular relations into market 
relations (Muniesa et al., 2007b). In this paper I argue that market ordering as a process could be seen 
as a market device as it organises and expands markets. In case of ICEF it also reconfigures what is 
student recruitment. Student recruitment in this sense becomes a complex set of market relations that 
is different from the social relations between a university and a student in the past when student 
recruitment was geared towards social redistribution, social mobility, and similar non-market social 
relations. 
 
Market ordering, therefore, is key in my analysis of market-making including constructing socio-
technical assemblages. Order is found to be basic for any market to function (Aspers, 2010; Beckert, 
2009), which implies three prerequisites (Aspers, 2011). The first prerequisite refers to some clarity of 
what the market is about in that things that are seen as similar are traded in the coherent market. The 
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second prerequisite refers to markets having rules that govern what to do or not to do in a market. 
This has to do with culture in the market, thus beliefs, norms, rules and behaviour, discourses and 
practices that are seen as appropriate to the setting. Finally, the third precondition refers to 
establishing economic value to what is traded. This can be done in different ways and includes various 
forms of valuation (Aspers, 2011).  
 
Beckert (2009) complements Aspers in theorising the market order by looking at how three basic 
market-making problems are resolved, namely that of value, competition and cooperation. The 
problem of value is resolved in the complex processes of valuation, which are subject to political and 
social struggles (Beckert, 2009). It includes normatively and cognitively framing or reframing things 
and services into commodities so that they become legitimate and accepted (Aspers, 2011; Beckert, 
2009). The problem of competition is resolved by establishing the rules of the exchange, where the 
state has an important role. And finally the problem of cooperation refers to interaction between 
supply and demand, reducing the risk for actors, reducing uncertainty, and establishing trust. Market 
ordering therefore brings into attention the building of formal and social market institutions that are 
stable and lasting, although processual and dynamic (Beckert, 1996, 2009).  
 
The processes of market-making through market ordering are traced in the analysis of the empirical 
data that was collected between March 2014 and May 2016. Methodologically this paper draws from 
the larger project on market-making in higher education and it therefore benefits from the analysis of 
other cases. However, for this paper the empirical data was collected from studying the case of ICEF 
GmbH.  
 
The first stage of data collection included statistical data provided by the OECD-UNESCO database 
regarding international student flows. Publicly available policy documents from countries that include 
international students’ recruitment agents in their strategies were collected. Moreover, literature and 
studies that provided information on the market of recruitment agents were studied as well. These 
documents were used to analyse the institutions and ordering of the recruitment agents market, to 
prepare for the study of ICEF and plan the interviews and observation.  
 
The second stage was the study of ICEF. ICEF provided the data on their workshops since 1995 
including anonymised information on participating agents, education institutions and exhibitors. In 
addition, publicly available documents about and from ICEF were collected, namely ICEF webpages, 
brochures, available news on the internet about ICEF, promotional material about its products and 
ICEF Monitor news. Three individuals in four interviews were interviewed between May and 
November 2014. Interviews lasted between 30 and 120 minutes, were semi-structured and inquired 
about ICEF’s practices and ways of working, communication with universities, as well as surrounding 
external environment. The interviews were transcribed verbatim. Observation of two ICEF workshops 
was made and conversations with participants were conducted that were recorded in the field notes. 
The interview transcripts and field notes were analysed with thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 
2006).  
 
3. About ICEF GmbH 
 
ICEF GmbH is a limited liability company based in Bonn, Germany. It was established in the late 
1980s as a chain of language schools. Today it sells a range of services and products, such as: 
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presence at workshops for education institutions to meet agents; exposure of exhibitors to potential 
clients at these workshops; offering marketing opportunities at workshops (including, sponsorship 
packages, catalogue advertising, display advertising, merchandise sponsorship, hospitality 
sponsorship, services sponsorships, and presentations). Furthermore, ICEF sells advertising space in 
its ICEF Monitor, an online medium providing market intelligence, conducts online agent training, 
and charges language training providers for the inclusion of their services in ICEF’s Internet search 
engine CourseFinders (ICEF, 2015a). ICEF has offices in Brazil, China, Russia, USA, Australia, 
Canada, Lebanon and the United Kingdom (ICEF, 2015d). It employs over 60 staff, a third of whom 
are based in Bonn and the rest work in the other offices (Interview N15, 28 May 2014).  
 
ICEF’s flagship commodity that it sells is attendance at its workshops, which are events that bring 
together ‘education institutions’ and ‘international student recruitment agents’ for a series of 
organised meetings between them. The types of education institutions that attend the workshops 
include: language schools; secondary and boarding schools; universities and other higher education 
institutions; and short course providers. They can be public, private, or a partnership between the two. 
The workshops are destination-specific (either in the international student ‘source’ country or their 
‘host’ country) and are not exclusive to a particular education sector or education level. The only such 
existing workshop that is specifically dedicated to a particular level of education is a workshop 
organised for higher education. It was launched in 2007 to address the growing demand on the side of 
agents (Interview with N15, 28 May 2014, and Interview N24, 16 June 2014). Much of the industry 
literature frames increased student demand for higher education in terms of the growth of a middle-
class in developing countries with aspirations for education and with resources to spend (OECD, 
2014). This increased demand was therefore an opportunity for agents to expand their business to 
include not just language courses, but education more broadly.    
 
In 2014, ICEF events were attended by around 1,800 agents from some 115 countries and around 
1,000 education institutions from 47 countries. Around 80 per cent of the agents recruited students to 
at least Bachelor’s level programmes, and around 35 per cent of education institutions were offering 
programmes at least at that level. Regarding the higher education specific workshop, 89 education 
institutions attended in 2014.  
 
I narrow my analysis of ICEF on its work only with regard to workshops among its other activities, 
and I restrict it to higher education although the majority of workshops are intended for all education 
levels. At the higher education level, ICEF is attempting to penetrate the sector and establish 
legitimacy for its presence. This is important, because ICEF is basing its market on two other markets, 
namely on the market for international students in which universities and states compete; and in the 
recruitment agents market where agents compete with each other to sell their services to universities 
to recruit students for them (see Table 1). However, the practice of universities using agents is still 
controversial in most countries (cf. Raimo 2014; Chopra 2015) and this fact presents a challenging 
situation for ICEF. The source of rules for emerging markets like that of agents is often the 
understandings brought from other markets (Fligstein, 2001). Here, ICEF is drawing on decades of 
experience in matching agents and language schools and using it in its foray into the higher education 
world as it actively tries to broaden its business and respond to agents’ demand.  
 
Table 1: Markets of ICEF operation in higher education. 
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Service of student 
experience, and 
higher education 
qualification at the 
end (like a diploma) 
International 
students 




Service of student 





Market of encounters Meetings between 
universities and 
agents 
Universities Providers of 
encounters* 
Selling  
Note: *These are private companies, chief among them being: Alphe from the UK, BMI from Brazil, FPP EduMedia from 
Brazil, ICEF from Germany, and Weba from Switzerland. 
 
 
4. The international student market 
 
The first market on which ICEF bases its market is that of higher education as an export industry. In 
other words, this is the global market, in which actors try to sell higher education to four and a half 
million internationally mobile students (OECD, 2015). It is hard, if not impossible, to disentangle the 
reasons for the competition among universities and nation states for international students, either for 
selling education and earn revenue from tuition fees or for competing for international students more 
generally in the knowledge economy imaginary (Komljenovic, 2016). Some states have framed their 
higher education as an export industry – they include the UK, New Zealand and Australia, amongst 
others (Lewis, 2005, 2011). Many countries have not only introduced tuition fees and other market 
elements into their respective higher education systems, but have also differentiated fees in that they 
charge higher fees to international students than to domestic students (OECD, 2015). Although some 
countries have no tuition fees and frame higher education as a public good, they nevertheless compete 
for international students at the global scale, as is the case in Germany (Kehm, 2014).   
 
Since the reasons for the competition for international students are diverse, it matters whether higher 
education is framed as an industry in a particular country. Consequently it has an impact on how ICEF 
operates in specific national contexts. In countries that sell higher education provision as a commodity 
for a tuition fee, universities use recruitment agents more freely than in countries that do not. This is 
because in those contexts, market-making has already cognitively reframed (Beckert, 2009) how 
higher education is viewed, valued, and validated. Even though agents may not yet be fully accepted 
in normative terms, they are nonetheless more easily tolerated. In countries where higher education 
provision is not sold for a tuition fee, it is harder for the respective universities to pay recruitment 
agents for each recruited student because such use of public money tends to be disputed. Hence in 
those contexts, agent-dominated markets have not yet emerged because of issues of legitimacy, and 
this is where different valuations of education clash. A good example is Sweden, which introduced 
tuition fees for non-EU students in 2011. This was also the time that Swedish universities started 
experimenting with using recruitment agents (Radio Sweden, 2015). The structure of relations and 




ICEF’s strategy in the context of higher education students market is to penetrate the sector as a 
legitimate actor and to further motivate the framing of higher education as an industry. To further this 
aim, it has positioned itself as an information and intelligence source by establishing ICEF Monitor, a 
free digital medium available online which provides information about higher education more 
generally. With i-Graduate (a UK-based company bought by the consultancy company Tribal Group 
PLC) it conducts the Agent Barometer, an annual study providing market intelligence about the 
international student market. Every year, ICEF’s staff attend the major sectorial conferences and 
exhibitions, the biggest being Association of International Educators (NAFSA) in the USA, and 
European Association for International Education (EAIE) in Europe. ICEF both takes part in the 
exhibitions organised during the events and puts forward speakers to present at the conference part of 
such events. In addition, there are a range of national, state and regional fora where ICEF promotes 
itself and its services, and by so doing, it is also normalising the practice of using recruitment agents. 
By attending and taking an active role in this variety of events, ICEF seeks not only to market itself 
and increase its visibility among existing and potential clients, but it is also doing cultural and 
political work in constituting an agents market. ICEF is thus familiarising universities with agents, 
offering data proving the success of using agents, and targeting cultural and other reservations and 
barriers. The following quote encapsulates ICEF’s attitude: 
 
Every year I do these presentations. If you come to my presentation 
tomorrow I will explain what is an agent, why use the agent. I am kind of 
preaching and I am convincing them that agents aren’t bad. (Interview with 
ICEF representative, 28 May 2014). 
 
 
ICEF is experimenting also with different ways to build relations with universities and to frame them 
as buyers of agents’ services and of ICEF’s services to arrange encounters with agents. In this context 




5. Student recruitment agents market 
 
International student recruitment agents are the second market that ICEF bases its commodity on (see 
Table 1 above). As already mentioned, recruitment agents are a relatively new phenomenon in higher 
education, but there is evidence that agents are a very important and influential factor in students’ 
decision-making, as well as in universities’ success in attracting high numbers of international 
students.  
 
However, universities’ use of agents is very unevenly spread across the world and there are many 
struggles and frictions in agents’ market expansion. Lack of regulation in the agents’ market is an 
important barrier for universities to use agents, particularly since universities increasingly seek to 
capitalise on their own brand, and the appeal and power of their respective national states. The risks 
involved in market relations with agents remain very high for universities. For example, universities 
risk tarnishing their brand if they establish relations with fraudulent agents. There have been reports 
of unethical practices amongst agents, and of provision of false information (Mazzarol, 1998). 
Reports about universities paying fees to agents for the recruitment of international students have 
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caused controversy in most ‘receiving’ countries (cf. Raimo 2014; Chopra 2015), and there have been 
suggestions that the practice was corrupting the academic system (Altbach & Reisberg, 2013). The 
legitimacy of, and trust in, the services offered by education agents is not yet fully established and 
there is constant clashing of values and views about the use of agents.  
 
Consequently, there have been attempts to regulate agents’ activities – starting in those countries 
where higher education is framed as an export industry, and where the recruitment of foreign students 
is clearly framed as a revenue-generating activity. These have been attempts to regulate agents ‘from 
a distance’, which means that agents are not regulated in their home country but in the country to 
which they send students, and in which the recruiting universities are based. For example, the British 
Council in the UK provides training for agents, good practice guidance, and manages a database of 
trained agents (British Council, 2015); the National Association for College Admission Counselling 
(NACAC) in the USA provides guidance on how to use agents (National Association for College 
Admission Counseling, 2014); Education New Zealand (ENZ) offers agents training programme, 
manages a database of trained and reliable agents, manages all promotional material and resources for 
these agents, and provides general support for univesities and agents (Custer, 2014; Education New 
Zealand, 2015a, 2015b); while Australia has put in place a system for agent approval (Custer, 2014). 
Thomson et al (2014) report that in the last decade, the British Council has reduced its direct presence 
in African markets and instead expanded its partnership with agents who have a presence in, and thus 
also operate, locally. Moreover, education officials from the UK, Australia, Ireland and New Zealand 
have adopted a code of ethics for international recruitment agents in what came to be known as the 
‘London Statement’ in 2012 (British Council, 2012a; British Council and Australian Government: 
Australian Education International, 2012).  
 
Agents themselves also report on problems they face in working with universities because of lack of 
market order, and the damage caused by non-professional agents. Therefore, agents too are looking 
for new kinds of regulatory devices and institutionalised practices to ensure the market, in which they 
sell their services, runs smoothly (ICEF Field notes, 13 September 2014).   
 
To sum up, in countries that frame higher education as an export industry, we can see some sort of 
instituting and ordering of the agents market that has been instigated and implemented by the state or 
state agencies. Public universities in these contexts are more freely using recruiting agents, although 
this practice is still not seen as completely legitimate by the public. Elsewhere, the practices vary. In 
those countries that do not have a large share of the international student market, public or traditional 
universities can use agents, but this activity is not yet culturally accepted and institutions try to hide 
this practice. I found this to be the case with public universities in some of the countries located in 
Central and Northern Europe (my interviewees and informants have cited cases from Germany, 
Denmark and Sweden). I have already mentioned how in Sweden the practice is now being gradually 
brokered into the sector following the introduction of fees for international students in 2011. In some 
countries, it is only private institutions or branch campuses of specific universities who use agents. 
Needless to say, some institutions do not use agents at all. The key factor determining whether or not 
universities use agents seems to be the perceived legitimacy of such practices in the context of the 
traditional public university, as well as the existence of market institutions and devices. Here, ICEF 





6. ICEF ordering the recruitment agents market 
 
When markets are emerging, actors make markets by construct the basic components such as trust, 
classifications, performance standards, valuation standards, soft law (voluntary agreements, 
associations, and routine knowledge), and institutional regulation by the state, traditions, social norms 
and networks (Fligstein, 2001). Setting up these elements is perhaps ICEF’s most important 
contribution to helping order recruitment agents’ markets.   
 
ICEF’s main ordering mechanism is its rigorous quality screening procedure that each agent has to 
undergo before being allowed to attend any of the ICEF workshops and to secure the right to return to 
future workshops. When ICEF sells places at its workshops to universities, it in fact sells a promise 
that they will meet quality agents. The screening includes checks of the agent’s legal status, the range 
of the agent’s activities, the variety of institutions and programmes they recruit to, as well as the 
number of students they serve, and their marketing strategies, amongst other things. In addition, ICEF 
requires the submission of four education institution references for each agent prior to each workshop. 
If agents pass this check, they are considered eligible to attend the workshop in question. Agents are 
monitored also at the event itself. After each meeting, each education institution and each agent fill 
out a feedback form for ICEF to monitor if the meetings were handled professionally. Any instance of 
misbehaviour or a no-show without a valid reason may result in a ban from attending future ICEF 
events.  
 
Second, ICEF offers training for agents which, it could be argued, constitutes yet another device for 
making agents to ascribe to certain rules, standards and procedures. ICEF offers free online training 
courses for agents. However, tests and course completion certificates are provided to the participants 
for a fee. Such certificates act as ‘quality seals’ that other actors can trust. There are four types of 
ICEF training available to education agents: a general course for any agent from any national context; 
two courses targeted at agents interested in recruiting students to the US and Canada; and one course 
with a focus on Chinese agents, who seek to recruit local Chinese students to foreign institutions.  
 
These training opportunities can be seen to be doing the work of regulating through the training 
process itself. ICEF is working to strategically lock-in its services in national spaces – either in the 
students’ receiving or the students’ sending countries. In the time of this research, ICEF has been in 
the process of conducting talks with the government of an Asian country to explore the possibility of 
using ICEF’s quality screening to create a list of approved agents, and for ICEF to organise local 
agent training opportunities. If the talks would lead to an agreement, ICEF’s quality seal and training 
programmes would become officially endorsed by a national government. Based on the discussions 
between ICEF and government representatives, universities in that country would receive funding 
from the government to pay fees to agents to recruit students. However, the funding could only be 
spent on ICEF-trained agents from the ICEF database.  
 
ICEF has created several other forms of cooperation with state agencies and other public 
representative bodies. For example, it has developed two destination specific trainings together with 
local authorities, and the governmental agencies that deal with education and trade. In addition, in its 
destination specific agent training for Canada and the USA, ICEF has created an advisory board in 
which it has included public agencies and bodies from those two countries together with agents’ 
representatives around the world. In the case of China, it has developed its programme together with 
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the Chinese government agency, BOSSA (Beijing Overseas Study Service Association), who is co-
delivering training for Chinese agents as a source country, and the Chinese Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security, who has recognised the course with its seal. With these actions of 
working with state actors, recruitment agents themselves and other actors, and creating committees 
and other bodies, ICEF is constructing market and social institutions, establishing environments for 
different actors to learn from each other, and building trust in the market. 
 
Agents face risks in markets too. Reputation and good practice are very important in agents’ work, 
particularly in the countries in which students rely heavily on agents’ support and advice. Therefore, it 
is very important for agents to cooperate with good and reliable universities. The agents that are 
reputable have a good track-record and are well established in the market, can be pickier in choosing 
with which university to work with (ICEF Field notes, 13 September 2014).  
 
There is a growing recognition that self-organised soft-law is an efficient way to regulate the industry 
(Beckert, 2009; Brabner & Galbraith, 2013). This would be where agents are regulated in their home 
country by consumer law, for instance, as opposed to being regulated by distance, as discussed above. 
In most countries agents themselves have formed associations, whose membership criteria help them 
regulate their own activities. In fact, ICEF is trying to encourage the regulation of the agents’ market 
in contexts where such structures do not yet exist, particularly in some African countries where they 
are lacking the most. Africa is increasingly seen as a significant importer of education services, partly 
because the number of potential students continues to grow, and partly because of the emerging 
investment opportunities in the region in education technology and online learning (British Council, 
2012b; British Council Education Intelligence, 2013, 2014). ICEF has recognised this and organised 
an initiative which assists agents from Africa in forming national and regional associations that would 
act as regulators of the agents’ market. ICEF has also organised a first meeting of African agents, 
provided a space for them to meet, invited agents from other countries as examples for social learning, 
and made itself available for possible mediation or help (Interview N23, 23 October 2014). ICEF 
believes that this was a good move, as market regulation and thus market order are important for 
ensuring trust among market agents and for motivating market transactions. 
 
ICEF training courses and certificates are, in effect, the industry standard (Beckert, 2009), and ICEF 
is determining what counts as agents’ professional practice and what constitutes the minimum 
standards for how agents operate. Moreover, ICEF’s quality checks, certificates, training, and 
motivating soft-regulation provide for trust-building and mutual learning, and in doing so set stable 
expectations in the market. And when agents enter the higher education sector, this now provides an 
opportunity for the encounters between them and universities. 
 
 
7. Constructing a marketplace and selling meetings 
 
So far I have analysed ICEF’s role in promoting higher education as an industry and supporting the 
market of international students (first market in Table 1); and examined ICEF as one of the actors who 
are ordering recruitment agents’ market (second market in Table 1). Now I move to analysing ICEF as 




ICEF’s flagship commodity that it sells is attendance at its workshops, which are events that bring 
together universities and recruitment agents and enable planned and structured meetings among them. 
Universities are charged an attendance fee, which depends upon the type of event and the date of 
registration (see Table 2), and also they cover their own travel and accommodation costs. Meanwhile, 
recruitment agents attend the workshops free of charge, whilst their accommodation costs are covered 
by the organisers. ICEF’s buyers are therefore education institutions, and the commodity that they buy 
is a promise to meet reliable and quality recruitment agents. Hence the agents’ presence at workshops 
is part of the service. 
 
Table 2: Prices for attending ICEF workshops for education institutions in 2015. 




First participant early rate € 3,900 €4,300 €2,925  AU$ 5,600 
First participant regular rate €4,400 €4,900 €3,300 €495 AU$ 6,300 
Second participant €2,400 €2,400 €1,800 €495 AU$ 3,400 
Note: ICEF offers discounts to institutions attending multiple workshops: 2 Workshops – 18%; 3 Workshops – 20%; 4 
Workshops – 23%; 5 Workshops – 25%; 6 Workshops – 27%. 
Source: ICEF (2015b). 
 
 
ICEF is careful to plan the participation of education institutions and agents as this is its service. 
There are always more agents than institutions so that enough meetings can be scheduled. Second, the 
geographical distribution of attendees is an important factor in considering which agents are allowed 
to attend. This serves the function of satisfying universities’ expectations in relation to access to 
agents from the key student sending countries. Hence ICEF has to manage exactly who is present at 
each workshop. Agents therefore apply for the workshops, are vetted, and then wait for ICEF to check 
if there is a need for an agent from the part of the world they represent. If so, they receive a 
confirmation from ICEF that they can attend.  
 
Stable expectations are preconditions for market exchange. In other words, market actors form 
expectations about what others will do, and then their expected behaviour must be sufficiently 
compatible (Aspers, 2009; Beckert, 2009; Fligstein, 2001). ICEF offers abundant material and 
individual consultations before workshops, and invests considerable time into the universities’ 
preparations for attending workshops. The preparations include information about what a university 
can expect from agents, what they need to give in order to receive a specific service, and what they 
cannot expect from agents, amongst other things. These lengthy preparations seek to fix universities’ 
expectations and serve the purpose of making the meetings with agents easier as the participants are 
better informed, and their satisfaction with the service tends to be higher.  
 
All workshops have the same format and last two and a half days. The programme starts in the 
afternoon of the first day with seminars on topics relevant to the international student market. The 
programme of the second and third day is filled with time slots for meetings in the style of ‘speed 
dating’ between education institutions and recruitment agents. For example, at the higher education 
workshop held in 2015 there were 26 slots for meetings of 30 minutes. During the events, education 
institutions remain at their allocated desks, while agents move around.  
 
All meetings are pre-scheduled through the online scheduling platform. When an education institution 
or an agent applies to attend a workshop, pay the fee, and in the case of agents get approved to attend, 
12 
 
they receive access to an ICEF-run online platform. By using this tool, the participants can check each 
other’s profiles, including information about the attendees’ country of origin, focus of work, statistics 
and so on, and request a meeting. If both parties agree to a meeting, it is considered to be scheduled. 
 
In addition to such structured meetings, ICEF also carefully constructs ample networking 
opportunities and the appropriate environment to support informal meetings. The workshops tend to 
be hosted in top-end hotels in attractive, central locations, while dinners and parties are organised in 
venues of historic or artistic importance within the respective cities. The events are therefore carefully 
planned to ensure that the participants enjoy their stay and can easily socialise.  
 
ICEF is engaged in designing a marketplace for the market encounters, where universities and 
approved agents meet; but how they proceed with their relationship is left to them. ICEF provides 
advice if asked, but it does not get involved in making specific deals and agreements. It is therefore 
very clear that ICEF plays a key part in ordering the agents’ market by designing the marketplace and 
setting its rules. By so doing, it engenders trust, fixes standards, establishes soft law, traditions and 
social norms, and creates networks (Beckert, 1996, 2009; Çalışkan & Callon, 2010).  
 
The increases in number and types of workshops from just one such event in 1995 to fourteen in 2016 
indicate the tendency of markets to grow and expand. Today there are six types of workshops, 
namely: global; regional; destination workshops; agent road shows; agent focus; and higher education 
partnership forum (see Table 3).  
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ICEF’s work can potentially influence the higher education sector, as the workshops can frame and 
reinforce specific kinds of roles between different states and institutions. For example, agents are able 
to influence a student’s decision as to which country to study in by highlighting the ease of 
administrative procedures in any one country. An agent from an African country reported to me that it 
takes months to arrange a visa for a local student wishing to study in the UK, whilst Singapore – 
which can also offer a high quality higher education experience, typically issues such a visa within a 
day for a cost of $2,000. Therefore, in situations where students are undecided about which study 
destination to choose, she would encourage them to go to Singapore (ICEF Field notes, 13 September 
2014). This often happens because students can come to agents to seek advice about where to study 
and only then for help with administration procedures. Agents, and ICEF as a broker, can thus 
reinforce the asymmetries between powerful and less powerful states/actors on the one hand, whilst 
also providing opportunities for new players to enter the market, on the other hand. 
 
To sum up, ICEF is constructing a marketplace where universities and student recruitment agents 
meet. It is carefully designing an experience for universities with clear expectations about the event, 
trustworthy agents, networking opportunities and pleasant social time. This analysis was focusing on 
the ordering of agents market and consequent expansion of the higher education industry, but it also 
indicated the potential of these kinds of markets to offer new forms and relations of competition 
between universities and states if agents will continue to be important factor in decision-making of 




This paper was interested in market ordering as a market device for market-making. More 
specifically, it was tracing market ordering processes in relation to constructing, instituting and 
expanding markets. The case was ICEF GmbH and its profiting from organising encounters between 
education institutions and student recruitment agents. For ICEF to sell the service of encounters to 
universities, it has invested first in promoting higher education provision as an industry where 
universities are increasingly sellers of the service of education; and international students buyers of 
student experience. Second, ICEF has invested in the ordering of the international students’ 
recruitment agents markets.  
 
ICEF quality screening and the act of attending ICEF workshops, agents training, ICEF’s committees 
and structures, student recruitment agents associations, rules, norms, data, and so on, could be 
interpreted as non-human elements of the socio-technical agencements that markets are (Çalışkan & 
Callon, 2010). Through these agencements of devices and people, ICEF constructs a relational 
structure that organises and expands markets of student recruitment agents. In other words, ICEF 
plays an active role in ordering recruitment agents markets. First, ICEF frames what these markets are 
about (Aspers, 2011) – what kind of service student recruitment is. Second, ICEF constructs rules of 
the markets (Aspers, 2011) – what actors can expect, how they are to behave, what standard of service 
counts with recruitment agents, what standard of quality of service is acceptable, and so on. Third, 
ICEF is part of re-valuing (Beckert, 2009) the meaning and value of higher education and of a student. 
It is legitimating the practice of paying fees to agents to recruit students and is working on cognitive 
reframing of students and education. Moreover, ICEF’s devices and institutions are serving the 
function of ordering market competition. Finally, ICEF is motivating market cooperation (Beckert, 




After ordering recruitment agents markets, ICEF is actively making its own market of providing the 
encounter service between universities and student recruitment agents. Here ICEF is building market 
and social institutions like partnerships with governments and committees to govern its trainings, 
providing market information on its service, competing with other providers of such service, and so 
on.  
 
Finally, we can notice a tendency to markets expansion and experimenting in search for profits. ICEF 
is in this sense increasing the number and variety of its workshops and other services. Here it is not 
just organising workshops where universities would meet agents, but its newest invention is 
workshops where universities meet other universities. Therefore ICEF is transferring its practice and 
experience from one market to the other.  
 
To conclude, I would argue that the questions of ordering markets and market expansions, and how 
markets build on each other, profit from each other, and learn from each other, are still under-
researched. We should learn more about the micro-processes of market ordering as part of market-
making. And finally, how can new market opportunities and markets as such grow from the processes 
of ordering other markets. The cases like ICEF would be lucrative sites for further research on these 





This work was supported by the European Commission FP7 People programme: Marie Curie Initial 









Altbach, P. G., & Reisberg, L. (2013). Agents and the ethics of international higher education. 
Retrieved August 9, 2016, from 
http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20130911143830201 
Aspers, P. (2009). How Are Markets Made? Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne. 
Retrieved from http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp09-2.pdf 
Aspers, P. (2010). Orderly Fashion: A Sociology of Markets. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press. 
Aspers, P. (2011). Markets. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Beckert, J. (1996). What is sociological about economic sociology? Uncertainty and the 
embeddedness of economic action. Theory and Society, 25(6), 803–840. 
Beckert, J. (2009). The social order of markets. Theory and Society, 38(3), 245–269. 
Brabner, R., & Galbraith, G. (2013). Using International Recruitment Agents: Risks and Regulations? 
Leadership Foundation for Higher Education. 
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in 
Psychology, 3(2), 77–101. 
British Council. (2012a). Landmark “International Code of Ethics” for education agents. Retrieved 
15 
 
August 3, 2015, from http://www.britishcouncil.org/organisation/press/landmark-international-
code-ethics-education-agents 
British Council. (2012b). The shape of things to come: higher education global trends and emerging 
opportunities to 2020. British Council. Retrieved from 
http://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/britishcouncil.uk2/files/the_shape_of_things_to_come_-
_higher_education_global_trends_and_emerging_opportunities_to_2020.pdf 
British Council. (2015). Education agents. Retrieved August 3, 2015, from 
http://www.britishcouncil.org/education/education-agents 
British Council and Australian Government: Australian Education International. (2012). Landmark 
“International Code of Ethics” for education agents. Retrieved August 3, 2015, from 
http://thailand.embassy.gov.au/files/bkok/AEI_London Statement.pdf 
British Council Education Intelligence. (2013). The Future of the World’s Mobile Students to 2024. 
British Council. Retrieved from https://ei.britishcouncil.org/educationintelligence/future-world-
mobile-students-2024 
British Council Education Intelligence. (2014). Postgraduate student mobility trends to 2024. British 
Council. Retrieved from 
http://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/britishcouncil.uk2/files/postgraduate_mobility_trends_2024-
october-14.pdf 
Çalışkan, K., & Callon, M. (2009). Economization, part 1: shifting attention from the economy 
towards processes of economization. Economy and Society, 38(3), 369–398. 
Çalışkan, K., & Callon, M. (2010). Economization, part 2: a research programme for the study of 
markets. Economy and Society, 39(1), 1–32. 
Callon, M. (1998a). Introduction: the embeddedness of economic markets in economics. In M. Callon 
(Ed.), The Laws of the Markets (pp. 1–57). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Callon, M. (Ed.). (1998b). The Laws of the Markets. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Callon, M. (2007). An Essay on the Growing Contribution of Economic Markets to the Proliferation 
of the Social. Theory, Culture & Society, 24(7–8), 139–163. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0263276407084701 
Callon, M., & Muniesa, F. (2005). Peripheral Vision: Economic Markets as Calculative Collective 
Devices. Organization Studies, 26(8), 1229–1250. 
Chopra, N. (2015). Universities, agents and international students: contribution and the controversy. 
Retrieved August 4, 2015, from http://blog.thepienews.com/2015/05/lets-get-this-straight-shall-
we/ 
Cronin, A. M. (2016). Reputational capital in “the PR University”: public relations and market 
rationalities. Journal of Cultural Economy, 9(4), 396–409. Retrieved from 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17530350.2016.1179663 
Custer, S. (2014). Education NZ’s new agent training programme. Retrieved August 3, 2015, from 
http://thepienews.com/news/education-new-zealand-launches-agent-programme/ 
De Luca, M. (2008). “Agent” - a Dirty Word? IIE Networker, 36–38. 
Drori, G., Delmestri, G., & Oberg, A. (2013). Branding the university: relational strategy of identity 
construction in a competitive field. Portland Press Limited. 
Education New Zealand. (2015a). Agent familiarisation programme. Retrieved August 3, 2015, from 
http://enz.govt.nz/how-we-work/business-development/regional-agent-funding-programme 
Education New Zealand. (2015b). Our role. Retrieved August 3, 2015, from 
http://www.enz.govt.nz/about-enz/our-role 
Fligstein, N. (2001). The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century 
Capitalist Societies. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
HM Government. (2013). Industrial Strategy: government and industry in partnership. International 
Education - Global Growth and Prosperity: An Accompanying Analytical Narrative. Retrieved 
August 3, 2015, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/340600/bis-13-
1081-international-education-global-growth-and-prosperity-revised.pdf 
Huang, I. Y., Raimo, V., & Humfrey, C. (2014). Power and control: managing agents for international 
student recruitment in higher education. Studies in Higher Education. 




ICEF. (2015b). ICEF Products Rate Sheet. Retrieved December 11, 2015, from 
http://www.icef.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/27/2014/11/Ratesheet-Euro-AU.pdf 
ICEF. (2015c). ICEF Workshops. Retrieved December 11, 2015, from 
http://www.icef.com/workshops/ 
ICEF. (2015d). Our Offices. Retrieved August 5, 2015, from http://www.icef.com/about-
us/offices.html 
ICEF Monitor. (2014). The agent question: New data has the answer. Retrieved December 15, 2015, 
from http://monitor.icef.com/2014/09/the-agent-question-new-data-has-the-answer/ 
Institute of International Education. (2015). Open Doors Data Special Reports: Economic Impact of 
International Students. Retrieved June 23, 2015, from http://www.iie.org/Research-and-
Publications/Open-Doors/Data/Economic-Impact-of-International-Students 
Kehm, B. (2014). How Germany managed to abolish university tuition fees. Retrieved June 22, 2015, 
from http://theconversation.com/how-germany-managed-to-abolish-university-tuition-fees-
32529 
Komljenovic, J. (2016). Making higher education markets. University of Bristol. 
Lewis, N. (2005). Code of practice for the pastoral care of international students: making a globalising 
industry in New Zealand. Globalisation, Societies and Education, 3(1), 5–47. 
Lewis, N. (2011). Political projects and micro-practices of globalising education: building an 
international education industry in New Zealand. Globalisation, Societies and Education, 9(2), 
225–246. 
Maslen, G. (2012, November 28). Education as an export is worth billions. University World News. 
Retrieved from http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20121128163603470 
Mazzarol, T. (1998). Critical success factors for international education marketing. International 
Journal of Educational Management, 12(4), 163–175. 
Mazzarol, T., & Soutar, G. (2012). Revisiting the global market for higher education. Asia Pacific 
Journal of Marketing and Logistics, 24(5), 717–737. 
Muniesa, F., Millo, Y., & Callon, M. (2007a). An introduction to market devices. In M. Callon, Y. 
Millo, & F. Muniesa (Eds.), Market Devices (pp. 1–12). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Muniesa, F., Millo, Y., & Callon, M. (2007b). An introduction to market devices. The Sociological 
Review, 55(Issue Supplement s2), 1–12. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2007.00727.x 
National Association for College Admission Counseling. (2014). International Student Recruitment 
Agencies: A Guide for Schools, Colleges and Universities. Retrieved from 
http://www.nacacnet.org/international/documents/intlstudentrecruitment.pdf 
O’Connell, N., & Wong, H. Y. (2014). Optimal Motivation and Governance of Education Agents. In 
S. Mukerji & P. Tripathi (Eds.), Handbook of Research on Transnational Higher Education (pp. 
118–137). Hershey, Pa.: IGI Global. 
OECD. (2014). Education at a Glance 2014: OECD Indicators. OECD Publishing. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eag-2014-en 
OECD. (2015). Education at a Glance 2015: OECD Indicators. OECD Publishing. 
Pimpa, N. (2003). The Influence of Peers and Student Recruitment Agencies on Thai Students’ 
Choices of International Education. Journal of Studies in International Education, 7(2), 178–
192. 
Radio Sweden. (2015). Attracting foreign students via local recruiting agents can be problematic. 
Retrieved July 9, 2016, from 
http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2054&artikel=6226951 
Raimo, V. (2014). Universities rely on agents to recruit international students – they shouldn’t try and 
hide it. Retrieved July 22, 2015, from https://theconversation.com/universities-rely-on-agents-to-
recruit-international-students-they-shouldnt-try-and-hide-it-35067 
Robertson, S. L., & Komljenovic, J. (2016). Non-state actors, and the advance of frontier higher 
education markets in the global south. Oxford Review of Education, 42(5), 595–611. 
Stein, S., & de Andreotti, V. O. (2015). Cash, competition, or charity: international students and the 
global imaginary. Higher Education. Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10734-
015-9949-8 
Strauss, V. (2013). Global education market reaches $4.4 trillion — and is growing. Retrieved March 
17 
 
25, 2016, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2013/02/09/global-
education-market-reaches-4-4-trillion-and-is-growing/ 
The Observatory on Borderless Higher Education. (2014). The agent question: insights from students, 
universities and agents. 
Thomson, A., Hulme, R., Hulme, M., & Doughty, G. (2014). Perceptions of value: assessing the 
agent/commission model of UK higher education recruitment in Africa. Africa Review, 6(2), 
105–120. 
Universities Australia. (2015). Key Facts and Data. Retrieved July 8, 2016, from 
https://www.universitiesaustralia.edu.au/australias-universities/key-facts-and-data#.V3-
AjKKrGUB 
Verger, A., Lubienski, C., & Steiner-Khamsi, G. (Eds.). (2016). World Yearbook of Educaiton 2016: 
The Global Education Industry. London: Routledge. 
 
